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Abstract: We study the interdependency between two markets,
where the rst involves oering production capacity, while on the
second actual production is sold. The key issue is that the ex-
pected product market outcome determines the opportunity cost
for bidding at the capacity market while the capacity sold on the
capacity market, since no longer available for spot market bidding,
in
uences the product market outcome. We show that a compet-
itive simultaneous equilibrium exists. This equilibrium is unique
and ecient. It is characterized by a u-shaped bidding function in
the capacity market with respect to the marginal cost of suppliers.
The leading example is the electricity industry, where there is a
capacity market clearing before the spot market.
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11. Introduction
Electricity markets are characterized by some properties that complicate a
matching of demand and supply. First, electricity is virtually non-storable
economically in large quantities. Second, demand for and supply of electricity
are not perfectly predictable. Third, supply has to equal demand at any time,
since otherwise the electricity grid would collapse. Moreover, due to technical
restrictions end-consumers cannot respond to real-time electricity prices, so
demand for electricity is basically inelastic in the short term (see, for example,
Patrick and Wolak (2001)).
To ensure system stability, a network operator procures capacity to compen-
sate for prediction errors and to ll the gap between demand and supply in the
short term.1 If demand exceeds supply, capacity is called. The procurement of
capacity is usually organized on a separate market platform.2 Demand for ca-
pacity is dened by the transmission system operator to ensure a well-dened
safety level regarding grid stability. In most European countries a procure-
ment auction is implemented in which the pricing mechanism can be uniform
or pay-as-bid. The market for capacity clears before the spot market does.
The key issue here is that providing generation capacity is costly for two rea-
sons: First, providing capacity decreases the potential spot market revenues.
These opportunity costs from foregone spot market participation are decreas-
ing in a rm's marginal cost. Second, keeping capacity ready for delivery on
demand induces costs which are increasing in a rm's marginal costs because
of a power plant's minimum production condition when being in a ready-to-
operate mode. Thus, a rm with low marginal costs will generate electricity
even when demand is low and will have relatively high opportunity costs from
foregone spot market revenues when oering capacity. Conversely, a rm with
high marginal costs will generate electricity only when demand is high, i.e.
its opportunity costs from spot market sales are low, and the rm's cost of
capacity provision are driven by being ready for delivery on demand. That is,
1In the electricity industry, capacity procured is called \inremental reserve", \reserve ca-
pacity" or sometimes \balancing power".
2As is the case in Germany, for example.
2rms with intermediate cost levels will place the lowest bids on the market for
capacity.
Although this form of interaction between a spot market and a capacity
market is specic to the electricity industry from what I know, there are several
markets where at least one of these cost components occurs. Costs of foregone
revenues from production always arise when assets are rented to somebody;
costs of capacity provision arise when keeping capacity ready to operate is
costly. The electricity industry, while being an important example for the
problem sketched in this paper, is not the only industry where both eects
occur simultaneously. We will discuss another example in the discussion at
the end of the paper.
In the following the analysis is conducted in terms of a spot electricity market
and a market for capacity. We consider a continuum of rms having pair
wise dierent marginal costs of electricity generation. Each one has a xed
production capacity, which he can split up so that a rm can sell quantities
on both markets at the same time. The technical restriction is imposed that
if a supplier wants to oer capacity he has to generate electricity at least at
some minimum production level. This is because a plant providing capacity
has to be running to ensure a short response time when capacity is called.
In this event, its electricity generation can be increased quickly. We will see
that the unique equilibrium consists of a u-shaped capacity market bidding
function and that the set of suppliers selected to provide capacity constitutes
an interval. Moreover, a welfare analysis will show that the equilibrium is
ecient.
There is small but growing literature on capacity procurement in the elec-
tricity sector. One important line of research is motivated by the fact that
capacity auctions can be seen as a multi-unit auction with interdependent pri-
vate values.3 The theory is applied to electricity markets in Hortacsu and
Puller (2008), for example. Swider (2007) introduces a model in which the
spot market is competitive and the capacity market is not. The prices on the
3The players' signals are interrelated since the opportunity cost consideration of every
player depends on the stochastic spot market demand.
3capacity market are modelled as random variables, which the bidders antici-
pate. Creti and Fabra (2006) model a short-term capacity market. Optimal
bidding strategies for market participants are derived under consideration of
opportunity costs that arise from foregone sales on a domestic and a foreign
electricity market. It is assumed that all players have identical marginal costs.
The authors derive equilibrium srategies for both a monopolistic and a com-
petitive market structure.
Closely related to the present paper is the work of Just and Weber (2008) and
Just (2011). These papers, in turn, rely partly on Chao and Wilson (2002), who
investigate optimal scoring rules on multi-dimensional procurement auctions
for power reserves. Just and Weber (2008) model the interdependencies be-
tween markets for secondary reserve capacity and spot electricity to derive the
pricing of capacity under equilibrium conditions in a uniform pricing setting.
Just (2011) applies this model set up and adresses questions on appropriate
contract durations in the German markets for reserve capacity. Both articles
investigate the model numerically. The present work provides analytical re-
sults for a specic form of the stylized model Just and Weber (2008) developed,
i.e it is proved that a unique ecient competitive equilibrium exists.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the model
is dened and the equilibrium concept is introduced. Some properties of the
model are derived, which allows for narrowing down the model's strategy space.
In Section 3 the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium is proved. Section 4
provides a welfare analysis which will show that the equilibrium derived earlier
is ecient. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the results.
2. The Model
The supply side is given by a continuum X = [0;1] of suppliers that have con-
stant and pair wise dierent marginal costs. Suppliers are sorted by their
marginal costs, so that the market's marginal cost curve c : X ! R+ is
strictly increasing. For the sake of analytical convenience, let c be dieren-
tiable. Moreover, c is common knowledge. I will refer to c as the \merit order
4curve" throughout the paper.
The production capacity of every supplier x 2 X equals one. Each supplier
bids quantities on both the spot and capacity market. Capacity market bidding
takes place rst. Moreover, the result of the capacity market auction is revealed
before the spot market bidding takes place. In a second step the spot market
will clear. Some of the overall generation capacity is then no longer available
since it has been contracted on the capacity market.
We assume every supplier x bids some price a(x) on the capacity market and
his marginal costs c(x) on the spot market. The share every supplier oers
on the capacity market is xed and given by  > 0.4 Thus, spot market only
strategies will be excluded. This is not a limitation since every supplier x may
choose a(x) arbitrarily high.
An independent system operator (ISO) ensures that demand is met cost
eciently, which means the ISO selects the lowest bids on both markets.
2.1. Strategy Space and Payo Function
The ISO ensures that demand for capacity ist met cost-eciently by selecting
the lowest bids. This can be formalized by dening an allocation which is an
integrable function




s(y)dy = Dc; (1)
i.e. demand for capacity is met.
For any given strategy prole a : [0;1] 7! R we want to nd an allocation
sa which is consistent with a in the sense that it ensures cost eciency, which
4This share is determined by a power plant's minimum and maximum production level as
well as the power plant's gradient (see M usgens et al. (2011) for details). For simplicity
let  be the same for every supplier. Typically,   0:1 (see for example Stoft (2002), p.
307).
5means that the following condition must hold:
If a(x) < a(y) and sa(y) = 1; thensa(x) = 1: (2)
Suppliers selected to provide capacity are rewarded by the marginal bid, i.e.




fa(x)j sa(x) = 0g
denote the marginal bid.
Thus, a strategy prole a and the corresponding allocation sa ensuring cost
eciency are interdependent. In order to be able to solve the model I will
provide some results for an arbitrarily chosen s which satises (1) but not
necessarily (2). These results hold for all a and all s and thus, in particular,
for a consistent pair (a;sa). From now on, let s be arbitrarily chosen, but
xed.
The allocation s transformes the supply function on the spot market for two
reasons: First, consider that demand for electricity on the spot market is high.
Then the rms providing capacity may happen to be inframarginal but can
only generate electricity at the level 1 . This leads to a higher price on the
spot market compared to the case where no market for capacity is considered.
Second, we impose the technical restriction that a power plant needs to
operate at a level of  in order to be able to provide capacity. This is because
otherwise a power plant cannot respond fast enough when capacity is actually
called. If a power plant is providing capacity, then the cost of generating 
are sunk, which implies that the rm will bid the share  at a price of zero on
the spot market. This leads to lower price on the spot market when demand
is low (cp. Figure 1).
In order to cover demand Dc for capacity the accumulated must-run produc-
tion amounts to q1 = Dc=, which means that q1 is a technical lower bound
5Since the merit order curve c is common knowledge, a pay-as-bid auction mechanism
would lead to the same market outcome (see M usgens et al. (2011)). All results on
existence, uniqueness and eciency of equilibria translate to the pay-as-bid case.
6for the overall electricity generation in our model. Accordingly, the maximum
electricity production in the market is given by q2 = 1   Dc. Let Q = [q1;q2]
in the following. Let now De denote the random spot market demand, where
the support of De equals Q.6 Let De be distributed with respect to some
probability measure P, and let E denote the expectation operator with re-
spect to P. For a given s we now want to dene the inverse demand function
ps : Q 7! [0;1) which maps quantities to prices and which is consistent with
the following assumptions:
 A supplier x who does not provide capacity, i.e. where s(x) = 0, bids all
of his capacity at marginal costs into the spot market,
 a supplier providing capacity is comitted to bid his must-run share  at
a price of zero into the spot market,
 he bids the remaining share 1  , which is assumed to strictly exceed
zero, according to his marginal costs in the spot market.
For a given allocation s let ms(x) denote the amount of electricity suppliers
bid into the market at a price not exceeding c(x). Then ms models the merit
order transformation resulting from s and the restrictions described above.
The transformation ms can be written as
ms :[0;1]  ! Q; (3)
ms(x) = q1 +
Z x
0
1   s(y)( + )dy:
That is, the integrand equals 1 if and only if s(y) = 0, which means that
supplier y will bid all of his capacity into the spot market. If s(y) = 1, he will
bid only the share 1   at marginal costs, whereas the share  is bid at a
price of zero and incorporated in q1. Since q1 is bid into the market at a price
of zero ms(0) = q1 holds.
6We may also allow for the support of De to be an interval which is a subset of Q. All
results persist, but the proofs will sometimes become cumbersome.
7Note that the merit order transformation ms is continuous and that it is
invertible as long as  +  < 1. Now the inverse m 1
s maps a given level of
demand to the supplier who's marginal costs equal the spot market clearing
price:
ps(De) = c  m
 1
s (De): (4)
Note that if Dc = 0, then ms is the identity and
ps(De) = c(De):
Figure 1 shows the transformation of the merit order c via ms: Since the
must-run capacity q1 is bid into the spot market at a price of zero, electricity
prices decrease when demand is low in comparison with the original merit order
c. Accordingly prices increase when demand is high since capacity with low
marginal costs is providing capacity instead of generating electricity.
Figure 1: The transformation of the original merit order c via ms.
8After having dened the inverse demand function we can express the payo
function. The must-run costs of a supplier x are given by the expected dier-











Correspondingly, the spot market revenues are given by the expected dif-
ference between spot market price and marginal costs, multiplied with the










The function  describes a (risk neutral) supplier's prots for a xed a and s
and equals the sum of expected revenues on both markets minus the expected




















Since the allocation s is arbitrarily chosen and does not ensure that demand
for capacity Dc is met cost-eciently,  is not the payo function but rather
a helping function. The payo function ~  is then given by
~ (x;a) := (x;a;sa): (8)
An equilibrium is a strategy prole a if for any x and any ~ a satisfying ~ a(y) =
a(y) as long as x 6= y it holds true that ~ (x;a)  ~ (x;~ a).
2.2. Firms Bid Opportunity Costs
In this section we will see that we can restrict the analysis to an opportunity
cost function b that arises from expected gains and losses from spot market
9bidding. The basic argument is that given complete information every supplier
bids his costs.
We will see that b is u-shaped along the merit order, which gives that those
suppliers providing capacity constitute an interval in X in every equilibrium.
This allows us to solve the interdependency of b and sb.
We now dene b in a way ensuring that the marginal bidder will exactly













Note that b(x;s) does not depend on the other supplier's bids. This is because s
is xed. Finding an equilibrium now reduces to nding the consistent allocation
s, which means that s must be the cost-ecient procurement of Dc if suppliers
bid according to b(;s).7






i.e. the marginal supplier is indierent between both markets. If supplier x







Any other supplier will place a bid that is lower than b and thus will gen-
erate higher revenues. Thus, the function b(;s) can be seen as a weakly best
response function. Moreover, every equilibrium a can be represented by a func-
tion of the form (9). The following proposition gives the formal statement.
Proposition 1. If a is an equilibrium strategy prole, then b(;sa) is an equi-
librium, too, and sa = sb as well as a = b.
Proof. See Appendix B.
7Equivalently speaking, nding an equilibrium reduces to nding a xed point of the map-
ping s 7! sb(;s).
10That is, the equilibrium b(;sa) is equivalent to a in the sense that the
market result does not change when moving from a to b(;sa). The basic
intuition behind this result ist that rms bid their costs in a uniform pricing
auction if the industrie's cost structure is common knowledge.
The rst summand of b descibes the foregone spot market prots a rm faces
when selling capacity. This cost component is decreasing in a rm's marginal
costs. The second summand describes the costs of being in standby when
oering capacity; these costs are increasing in a rm's marginal costs. Unsur-
prisingly the sum of both cost components is a convex function, as Theorem 1
implies:
Theorem 1. The opportunity cost function b(;s) is continuous and u-shaped.
Proof. See Appendix A.
U-shaped means that b(;s) has a unique global minimum and strictly de-
creases beforehand and strictly increases afterwards. Theorem 1 states that
suppliers at the boundary of X have high opportunity costs when bidding on
the capacity market: For x = 0, expected losses from not bidding on the spot
market are high, since the marginal costs are low. On the other hand, his
must-run costs equal zero. Conversely, x = 1 has high must-run costs due to
his high marginal costs, but his expected gains from spot market bidding are
zero. If a supplier's marginal costs are close to the expected spot price he will
place a relatively low bid.
The next corollary gives more information about the minimum of b(;s).
This result is provided because our strategy to show existence and uniqueness
of equilibria will rely on controlling the minimum's location.
Corollary 1. The bidding function b(;s) has a unique global minimum x and
x is dened by




Proof. The existence of the minimum follows from the shape of b(;s). The
characterization of the minimum's location follows from the proof of Theorem
1 (see Appendix A).
11Corollary 1 implies that if the set of suppliers providing capacity is an in-
tervall, and if the interval moves to the right, then the minimum x moves to
the left { this follows from the denition of ms.
3. Existence and Uniqueness of an Equilibrium
The following Theorem 2 states that in every equilibrium the set of suppliers
providing capacity is an interval in X, which is due to the shape of b. This
result is the key to our solution procedure: It allows us to establish a one-to-one
correspondance between X and the set of all allocations s that can eventually
arise in an equilibrium.
Theorem 2. In every equilibrium the set of suppliers providing capacity is an
interval.
Proof. The statement follows from the shape of b(;s).
From now on, dene h := Dc= to ease notation. That is, h is the length of
the intervall of suppliers providing capacity. We dene sx by
sx(y) = 1 if and only if y 2 [x;x + h]:
By a slight abuse of notation let mx denote the corresponding merit order
transformation.
Now, the strategy to prove the existence of equilibria relies on the observa-
tion that by restricting the shape of s we have established a mapping
x 7! b(;sx)
which maps [0;1 h] bijective to the set of strategies in which every equilibrium
must necessarily be located, which is due to Theorem 2. We will analyze the
function g dened by
12g :[0;1   h] ! R;
x 7! b(x + h;sx)   b(x;sx):
Figure 2 provides the connection between g and equilibrium solutions. The
horizontal axis shows the continuum of suppliers. The interval [x;x + h] con-
tains those suppliers that are selected by sx to provide capacity.
Consider the case where g has a zero. This corresponds to Fig.2B, where
b(x;sx) = b(x + h;sx) holds true, and where every supplier providing capacity
is located in the inner of X. An obvious condition for g to possess a zero would
be that given the allocation s0 the intervall [0;h] of rms providing capacity is
located on the left side of the minimum of b(;s0) and that given the allocation
s1 h the intervall is located on the right hand side of the minimum of b(;s1 h).
Since b is u-shaped, it would follow that g(0) < 0 and g(1   h) > 0, and since
g is continuous, a zero would exist. The next proposition proves the existence
of a zero under these two conditions just mentioned above.
Contrarily, in the cases (A) and (C) the underlying model parameters are
specied in a way that there does not exist an equilibrium in which b(x;sx) =
b(x + h;sx) holds, which means g does not have a zero. In this case, it must
be g > 0 or g < 0 everywhere, since g is continuous. If g < 0, dene x = 1 h,
which corresponds to Fig.2A, and if g > 0, dene x = 0, which corresponds to
Fig.2C. However, it is the case, but not apparent, that (A) and (C) constitute
equilibria.
In the remainder I will sometimes refer to the equilibrium pictured in Fig.2B
as an inner equilibrium or inner solution, since x lies in the inner of [0;1   h].
The next proposition establishes some properties of g and provides sucient
conditions that g has a zero, which is intuitively the case when the ratio Dc=Q
is suciently small and  is suciently large. Since this line-up is typically
given in markets for capacity (Dc=Q  0:03;  0:3), the inner equilibrium as
pictured in Fig.2B can be seen as the typical equilibrium.
13Figure 2: The three dierent possible types of equilibria.
Proposition 2. The function g has at most one zero. If g has a zero x0, then
g is strictly increasing in a neighbourhood of x0. A sucient condition for g
























The intuition is that demand Dc for inremental reseve is relatively low com-
pared to demand De for electricity (cp. Figure 2).
Proof. See Appendix C.
The rst inequality ensures that g(0) < 0, the second inequality leads to
g(1   h) > 0. Since g is continuous, if follows that g has a zero.
Note that if  = 0, no costs of keeping the plant running arise, so that the
rst equality always holds true. On the other hand, since  < 1, the second
inequality does not hold true for any conguration of the model parameters, as
long as  = 0. This is consistent with the fact that b is strictly decreasing when
 = 0, which is easy to see. The next theorem is an immediate consequence
of the proposition above.
14Theorem 3. A unique equilibrium exists.
Proof. We will split the existence proof in three parts.
Firstly, assume that g has a zero x0. It is apparent that b(;sx0) is an
equilibrium in this case.
Second, let g > 0 everywhere. The proof of Proposition 2 gives that












The rst equation is a calculation. Now, b(;s0) is an equilibrium (as pictured
in Fig.2C): Combining expressions (12) and (13), we conclude that the mini-
mum of b(;s0) is located in [0;h], since the mapping x 7! P(De  m0(x)) is
strictly increasing in x. Since b(;s0) is strictly increasing on [h;1], condition
(2) is satised.
Third, let g < 0 everywhere. Then b(;s1 h) is an equilibrium as pictured
in Fig.2A: We argue by similar considerations as in the second case that
minX b(;s1 h) 2 [1   h;1], which gives the statement.
As in the existence proof, we will examine three cases in order to prove
uniqueness. First, let g > 0. Assume that there exists x > 0 and that
b(;sx) is an equilibrium. Let x denote the minimum of b(;sx). It follows
that x 2 [x;x + h]. Since g > 0, it holds true that b(x;sx) < b(x + h;sx):
Since b(;sx) is continuous and strictly decreasing on [0;x], we may choose
y 2 [0;x] so that b(y;sx) < b(x + h;sx). On the other hand, it holds true that
sx(x + h) = 1, sx(y) = 0, which is a contradiction to the cost-eciency of sx.
The second case in which g < 0 is similar to the rst and is omitted.
Third, if there exists x0 so that g(x0) = 0, then x0 is unique, which follows
from Proposition 2.8 We conclude that in this case there exists exactly one
equilibrium of the form pictured in Fig.2B. Moreover, b(;s0) and b(;s1 h)
do not constitute equilibria either, since, according to Proposition 2, it holds
8If we allow for the support of De to be an interval which is a subset of Q, then g is not
strictly increasing anymore but only nondecreasing. However, if [x;x + h] \ supp(De) is
empty, then g(x) 6= 0, because then b(x;sx)   b(x + h;sx) has a very simple form and
will equal either c(x+h) c(x) or c(x) c(x+h). If [x;x+h]\supp(De) is non-empty,
then g0(x) > 0 (see appendix). That is, the null of g remains unique.
15true that minX b(;s0) = 2 [0;h] and minX b(;s1 h) = 2 [1 h;1]. At last, for any
x 2 X satisfying x 6= 0;x 6= 1 h and g(x) 6= 0, b(;sx) does not constitute an
equilibrium by the arguments of the rst case.
4. Welfare Analysis
In this section we will see that the equilibrium is ecient. Since demand for
capacity is inelastic, an ecient supply allocation is sucient for eciency. A
supply allocation, in turn, is ecient if it minimizes overall costs (M usgens
et al., 2011).
The result is not apparent for the following reason: The optimal bid on the
market for capacity is determined by a rm's opportunity costs emerging from
potential later spot market activities. Since the outcome of the market for
capacity does transform the supply side of the spot market, one has to argue
how a rm's opportunity costs transform into a consumption of ressources
induced by electricity generation in order to prove eciency.
To provide intuition we will discuss the issue in a heuristic manner. For the
moment, let demand De for electricity on the spot market be constant and
equal some value d. Apparently, any ecient allocation is given by an interval
[x;x+h] that contains the marginal supplier m 1
x (d): If the interval was located
on the left, then there would exist a rm y  x+h which is inframarginal, i.e.
c(y) < px(d). Clearly, one could reduce costs by shifting the interval to the
right so that y provides capacity and a cheaper rm solely produces electricity.
On the other hand, x  d is an apparent necessary condition for cost eciency.
Now, let m 1
x (d) 2 [x;x + h]. We will discuss the marginal eect of shifting
the intervall [x;x + h] to the right.
Note rst that shifting to the right implies that x will not provide capacity
anymore and can increase its production by the share . At the margin, this




16On the other hand, additional must-run costs emerge that equal
c(x + h):




Shifting to the right thus changes costs according to


0(x) :=c(x + h)   c(m
 1
x (d)) + [c(x)   c(m
 1
x (d))]
=[c(x + h)   px(d)]   [px(d)   c(x)]
=g(x):
Now, if sx is the allocation of an inner equilibrium, then g(x) = 
0(x) = 0.
In fact, x minimizes 
, since g is strictly increasing in a neighbourhood of x .
For the general case let us consider the expected costs of electricity produc-











The rst summand describes the the expected costs of generating electricity
with respect to the transformed merit order when demand exceeds q1, whereas
the second summand describes the costs that arise from generating the amount
q1 due to the must-run condition.
Proposition 3. The overall cost function 
 satises 
0 = g.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The factor  arises because the opportunity costs b(;sx) are per-unit costs,
whereas 
 describes the overall costs of production. Theorem 4 is an immediate
consequence of Proposition 3.
17Theorem 4. Any equilibrium is ecient.
Proof. This follows from the proposition above: If there exists an inner equi-
librium and if sx denotes the equilibrium allocation, then 
0(x) = 0. Since g is
strictly increasing in a neighbourhood of x according to Proposition 2, x is a
local minimum of 
. If g does not have a zero, then s0 or s1 h is the equilib-
rium allocation. Since 
0(x) 6= 0 for all x, 
 is minimized by 0 or 1   h. Since
the range of suppliers providing capacity must contain the bidding function's
minimum in an ecient solution, 
 is minimized by 0 if and only if s0 is the
equilibrium allocation.
5. Discussion
We analyzed a stylized model that accounts for the main interdependencies
between a spot electricity market and a capacity market. We have seen that
the strategy space of the suppliers may be restricted to an opportunity cost
function which is u-shaped: Opportunity costs arise from the alternative of
spot market participation instead of providing capacity. These opportunity
costs are decreasing in marginal costs. Additional costs of capacity provision
arise from the technical requirement that power plants need to be running when
they provide capacity, and these marginal costs are increasing with marginal
costs.
An immediate consequence of this result is Theorem 2, which states that in
every equilibrium the set of suppliers providing capacity is an interval. This
gives that a unique equilibrium exists. Moreover, the equilibrium is ecient,
since the opportunity costs a rm faces when placing a bid on the market for
capacity turn into true costs when it comes to electricity generation on the
spot market.
In the model suppliers dier only by their marginal costs. In reality, there
is a large number of dierent power plants that exhibit very dierent technical
and economical properties. For example, the share of capacity a power plant
can oer on the capacity market depends on its specic technology, and some
technologies do not even meet the technical requirements for providing capacity
18at all. Moreover, the minimum load condition varies extensively, and can even
be zero (in the case of a pumped storage power station).
As mentioned earlier, the results developed might translate to other markets
where there is demand for products as well as for production capacity. There
are three essential characteristics the market must possess: (i) The rms dier
with respect to their marginal prots per unit, (ii) the overall prot a rm
generates is increasing in the product market demand and (iii) a rm has xed
costs of being ready-to-operate that are decreasing in the rm's marginal prot
per unit. Beyond doubt, property (iii) is rare.
But consider, for example, two dierent restaurants A and B. Restaurant
A has a reputation, whereas restaurant B has not. Every other restaurant in
town is located in between of A and B regarding its reputation. All restaurants
have an identical cost structure and provide service of equal quality. Due to
restaurant A's reputation, prices in restaurant A are higher than in restaurant
B, and the same translates to the prot per (customer). This gives property
(i). Assume that the potential customers are equally distributed across those
restaurants that are open on a specic day.9 This gives property (ii).
Now, consider a small group of businessmen that wants to rent a dining hall
in one of these two restaurants for a meeting. We will analyze the costs of
renting the dining hall to the businessmen both restaurants face on a day with
average demand.
Since restaurant A generates the highest prot per customer it will be the
last restaurant in town to be closed when demand decreases. In particular, it
will be open when demand is on average. Since the group of businessmen is
suciently small, restaurant A will eectively loose customers when renting
the dining hall to the businessmen. Thus, there arise opportunity costs from
sending customers away.10
Conversely, due to the relatively low number of guests restaurant B will not
be able to recover its labor costs that evening and thus it will be closed.11
9We just assume that this price structure and distribution of customers constitute a short
term equilibrium.
10Here, we neglect the possibility that businessmen spend more money on average.
11On the basis of an ex-ante estimation, of course.
19Now, if the group of businessmen is suciently small, the costs for restaurant
B for renting a dining hall are driven by its labor costs which have to be
recovered, i.e. by its costs of keeping capacity ready for delivery on demand.
Now, if restaurant C has two dining rooms, it will operate the one that is not
rented and thus will generate a contribution margin to cover its labor costs.
That is, a restaurant with low marginal prots per unit has high costs of being
ready-to-operate, which gives property (iii).
If prices decrease from A to B, then a restaurant with intermediate prices
will oer the cheapest dining hall. Let C denote this restaurant. Notice that
the allocation of the regular customers to the restaurants is transformed when
C rents a dining hall to the businessmen: If C was open anyway, then renting
the dining hall means decreasing supply on the product market. If C was
originally meant to be closed, then renting the dining hall leads to an increase
of supply on the product market, as long as C comes with at least two dining
halls.
20Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Let a be an equilibrium. We show that b(x;sa)  a if and only if a(x)  a:
Choose x 2 X so that sa(x) = 1 and a(x) 6= b(x;sa). Since a is an equilibrium,
we must have b(x;sa)  a, since b(x;sa) > a would imply (x;a;s) <
b(x;sa), which is impossible since a is an equilibrium. This implies sa = sb
and the statement follows.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Since b(;s) is an integral of a bounded function and since the merit order curve
c is dierentiable, b(;s) is continuous everywhere and dierentiable almost
everywhere. Let ~ X denote the set of points where b(;s) is not dierentiable.




0(x)[(1 + =)P(De  ms(x))   1]:
Recall that c0 > 0 by assumption. The term on the right-hand side is
increasing in x and equals zero if and only if P(De  m(x)) = (1 + =) 1.
Let F denote the distribution function of De. Then F is invertible on [0;1]












Since b(;s) is not dierentiable everywhere, it remains to show that b(;s) is
strictly decreasing on [0;x] and strictly increasing on [x;1]. We dene
b
0(x;s) := 0 8x 2 ~ X:
As it is an antiderivative of a function that is integrable with respect to the
Lebesgue measure, b(;s) is absolutely continuous. Thus, we may express b(;s)
21as





If x;y 2 [0;x] and x < y, we conclude





A similar argument shows that b(;s) is strictly increasing on [x;1].
C. Proof of Proposition 2
To see that g has a zero under the assumptions of Proposition 2, we will show
that g(0) < 0 and that g(1   h) > 0 holds true. Then the statement follows
since g is continuous.




This means that under the allocation s0 the minimum of the corresponding
bidding function b(;s0) is located on the right hand side of the interval [0;h].
This is sucient, since according to Theorem 1 b(;s0) is strictly decreasing on
[0;x].
A calculation shows that we have m0(h) = h   Dc. Corollary 1 gives that
P(De  m0(x)) = (1 + =) 1. Since the mapping x 7! P(De  m0(x)) is
strictly increasing in x it is sucient to show that




which follows from the assumptions:










22The proof that g(1   h) > 0 holds is similar. We have to show that
1   h  argmin
x2X
b(x;s1 h) := x;
which means that under the allocation s1 h the minimum of the corresponding
bidding function is located on the left hand side of the interval [1  h;1]. It is
sucient to show that




which follows again from our assumptions:
P(De  m1 h(1   h)) = P(De  q1 + 1   h)
= P










We will now see that we can nd values x1;x2 2 [0;1   h] so that g(x) < 0
if x  x1, g(x) > 0 if x  x2 and so that g is strictly increasing on [x1;x2].
This is sucient to prove the proposition.
Note rst that Corollary 1 implies that if the range [x;x+h] of rms provid-
ing capacity moves to the right, then the minimum of b(;sx) moves to the left,
because the mapping x 7! mx() is increasing in x. This means that under
the assumptions of the proposition there exists a value x1 so that the right
edge of the interval [x1;x1+h] and the minimum of the corresponding bidding
function b(;sx1) coincide, i.e. x1 + h minimizes b(;sx1). On the other hand,
there exists x2 so that x2 minimizes b(;sx2).
The u-shape of the bidding function and the fact that g(0) < 0 imply that
g(x) < 0 if x  x1 and g(1 h) > 0 implies that g(x) > 0 if x  x2. It remains
to show that g is strictly increasing on [x1;x2]. Choose x and y satisfying
23x1 < x < y < x2. We will show that g(y)   g(x) > 0. This can be written as
g(y)   g(x) = b(y + h;sy)   b(y;sy)   (b(x + h;sx)   b(x;sx))







Let's have a look at (II):






Now, expression (B) strictly exceeds zero, because the function b(;sy) is u-
shaped, and the function's minimum strictly exceeds y by construction of
[x1;x2]. It remains to show that expression (A) is non-negative. To see this,
choose z < x < y and consider the dierence b(z;sx)   b(z;sy). We will show
that this dierence is non-negative, and since the dierence is continuous in z,
the limit z ! x is non-negative. Key to this result is the observation that the
must-run costs of rm z are equal for both the allocation sx and sy, because
must-run costs only occur for z when a rm ~ z < z happens to be the marginal
supplier on the spot market. Since ~ z < z < x < y, the must-run costs of z
are not aected when moving from sx to sy. On the other hand, the foregone
spot market revenues for z decrease when the allocation moves from sx to sy,
because the spot market price (weakly) decreases. More formally (note that
mx  my):








































x (t))f(t)dt = 0:
24It remains to show that (I) is non-negative. The proof is similar to the proof
that (II) exceeds zero: By construction, x + h and y + h are located on the
right hand side of the minimum of b(;sx) so that we can take advantage of
the u-shape of b(;sx). Moreover, the foregone spot market revenues of a rm
z > y +h are not aected when the allocation moves from sx to sy in analogy
to the situation above. The details are omitted.
D. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. By applying Fubini's theorem to the rst summand of (14) and then
transformation formula with transformation mx we calculate (remember mx(0) = q1,
















In order to be able to calculate the derivative of 
 we write (not that on the



















Note now that on [0;x] and [x + h;1], the function mx() does not depend on
x, which makes it easy to dierentiate expressions (16) and (18) with respect
25to x. Expression (17) is dierentiated by applying the multi-dimensional chain









0(x) =c(x)P(mx(x)  De)   c(x + h)P(mx(x + h)  De)
+ (1      )[c(x + h)P(mx(x + h)  De)   c(x)P(mx(x)  +De)]




=c(x)[( + )P(mx(x)  De)   ]
  c(x + h)[( + )P(mx(x + h)  De)   ] (20)





















=c(x)[P(mx(x)  De)   P(De  mx(x))]
  c(x + h)[P(mx(x + h)  De)   P(De  mx(x + h))]




=c(x)[( + )P(mx(x)  De)   ]
  c(x + h)[( + )P(mx(x + h)  De)   ]
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